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Dchatc and research on Nordic governmental cooperation has for long been premised on 
the assumption that the impelling forces behind such cooperation are to he found inside the 
:S:,,rdic countries themselves. Nordic cooperation has been regarded as an alternative to 
Europe This article proceeds from the assumption that international or exlemal factors 
have to he taken more into consideration. They form a framework for the political activities 
nl the ~ordic countries an<l could he charactcri1:c<l as long-term factors. Other relevant 
long-term factors arc economic. industrial. and social structures of the Nordic countries. 
Considering these external and long-term factors does not imply disregarding inlernal 
factors and day-to-day events or current affairs. s/10n-1erm factors. The three dichotomies 
cxlcrnu!/intcrnal, long-term/short-term, and economic/political factors are used as tools of 
analysis. A systematic use of the concepts leads to the conclusion that external political and 
economic long-term factors operate centrifugally on Nordic cooperation. Internal political 
factors have occasionally worked for Nordic cooperation. Yet these internal political 
factors. as a rule of a short-term kind, have been exceeded by the stronger external political 
and economic factors of a long-term kind. There has been no independent Nordic 
alternative to Europe. This conclusion is based on a long historical perspective. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For a long time the debate on Nordic coop-
eration has been much alive in the Nardi~ 
countries. There has also been not unim-· 
p<'rtant research - although descriptive 
rather than explanatory - on the forms and 
content of this cooperation. It is astonishing 
to what extent both debate and research 
have almost exclusively treated this Nordic 
cooperation as a purely Nordic problem. 
The impelling forces for Nordic cooperation 
have been sought inside the Nordic coun-
tries themselve~. The explanations of Nor-
dic cooperation - or, if you wish, the non-
appearance of Nordic cooperation - have 
largely been missing. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse 
Nordic cooperation from a somewhat differ-
ent point of departure than the prevalent 
one. The intention is srstematicallv to take· 
_into consideration fact"ars affecting Nordic 
cooperation both inside the Nordic countries 
and in the surrounding world and of both a 
long-term and short-term kind. 
For a successful analysis it i~ necessary in 
a more distinct fashion than in earlier re-
search to discern and define these external 
or international and internal or inter-Nordic 
factors. 
The external or international factors pro-
vide a framework for the foreign political 
act1v1t1es of the Nordic countries. Of 
course, this framework is not constant but 
varies over time. However, change occurs 
slowly and hardly becomes apparent during 
a short period of time. Therefore the exter-
nal factors could be characterized as long-
term factors. Other long-term factors of re-
levance here are the economic, social, and 
industrial structures of the Nordic countries. 
These structures also change slowly. 
Stating that these long-term factors are 
relevant does not imply disregarding day-to-
day events or current affairs. Tariffs, bal-
ances of payments, competition capability 
of one country/industry compared with that 
of other countries/industries, i.e. taxes,' 
wages, energy costs, and so on, are exam-
ples of factors that change more rapidly 
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than the long-tenn ones. They can be re-
ferred to a, JhorHerm factors. 1 
There i, no absolute borde~line between 
the shon-tcrm and the long-term factors and 
there is interaction between them A short· 
tcnn tariff or tax policy may for instance 
have effect, on the long-term industrial 
structure. For instance, Norwegian industry 
changed during the I 95(h from having been 
very vulnerable to being very competitive. 
It goe, without ,aying that the economic 
and cornmcrual structure of a country is of 
fundamental importance when analysing its 
forci!'n policies. It i, necessary to take these 
cco11nmi, factors into consideration. How-
ever. it 1s not enough to consider economic 
and commercial prerequisites when dis-
rnssin),' the 1,,reign polllical outlook of a 
count!}. h,n:i).'n policies arc also deter-
mined, hy conscious political decision, One 
could s:iy tk,1 the econo1n1c factors form a 
fra111cwork """k "hich ditkrcnt politic·al 
dcl'.i'-IIOn', ;ire t1H:LL'J\ahlc The economic 
lacior, co1Jld kad lo diffrrcnt p11lit1cal dcci-
'"""· Thus these/'' ,/,11, ul factors must-also 
tw l11n,.,,1dl r·~·d ()t u,ur,c hoth ~conon1iL 
:tnd p1d!IH..:;i/ f,h l1ir, Lal! ~l' or an CXll'ITlaJ 11f 
.u1 1nkrnal k1nd ,t.., ·,~\·:! ,t·, iunt!-tcrn1 or 
\JllH1-kn1\ 
In 11i., flU'ntl\ puh:ishcJ lhc·,i, ;,ho11 '1e 
l\ord11.. ,,·11\Tclflh ui;,,,n nc.1!(il1ati(1n<.., llJ47-· 
J9S<J ;1 J1,rif h1,,,1t1nl al p·,·r,pl'LllVl' \1,·hi1.:h 
!(1 ;1 Luge l'\!cr:f '.\ f' J\" :~g i11 l·,trl!L·r rL'-
"~·.1rch 1,11 .'\:t,rd11.· i_t1, 1pcr.1111i11 J.rHI s.i,uh·-_· 
lll,lll'TLtf flpf l'.1r!1L·f d\,1J/;1hl\..• /i:1\1..' lilchfc It 
pj),,,blt: fit lhrnv. !,·_· l1rh1 ,1p1,n \~ord1c 
1.'0d~x·r;1t11111: i !01.",l' 1,·-,ui1, 1d 11,11:;..· !JJ:1k1..· 1t 
p,•v~1hlc f·,1 11:Jt \:11rd11.. ,i:1,\l'fll!l!L'lll:d ,·\lOP· 
cr.1tinn m ,1 11,··.\ 1wr--r1~·1.1:·"· Till' l)lJrj)(l\L' 
fll'ft· ;·-, (il 1li.."','...l11p 1'11..• 1.1lll1.lU\IIHh Ill ill\ 
Iii,·"':·. r,1 .1 !1J;_qc ~vncr;tl \H.",\ 011 .,,,ni11..· 
~ ·.-t.lJ·t'Llli1lll ll\lllf Htl' l!l!l'l' :1hP\l'-llil'Tl-
lJ1)Jl(.'~' d1du11,11q1c, .: .... t( 1;,I\ 1 if ~tn,th ,1\. 
. ,1~·t 1 •• 11 and 111'L·nul L11.. tur\, 
!ii:i!! :enn .,nd ~h1..1rt·tL·nn LKl,.1r". :1t1J 
l· ... ·.1nd ·.,, .tn,l j'k.li:'.H .. d f:1,.-tnr,. 
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cooperation will be regarded panly in the 
light of the international environment and 
partly in the internal milieu. Both interna-
tionally and internally I will discuss 
economic and political aspects and di~cern 
long-term and short-term factors. , 
This use of the concepts external' and 
internal, long-term and short-term,· a_nd 
economic and political factors can be re-
garded as a method to discern explicitly the 
premises for Nordic governmental coopera· 
tion. 
II. THE HISTORY OF NORDIC coop. 
ERATION 
The plans for a Scandinavian defence union 
in 1948-1949, the negotiation, concerning a 
1\ordic customs union in 1947-·1959, and 
the Nordck Plan lor a Nordic common mar-
ket around 1970 arc the three p,lst-war 
examples of how attempts to create '\:ordic 
L'Ooperalion in n~nrc PrganizeJ forms have 
failed. The defence 1111ion tall,.s broke down 
when Sweden could 1:Pt accept it as a link 
"1th ~·cstcrn military cooperation. In.stead 
of joining a 1\ord1c c·ust,mh uni,1n. the 1\ur-
dic countric.s bcc:imc mc111ber.s of the Emo-
pcan hee Trade As.so,·i~[Jon (EFTA) 
h,·: .. bl by c;recit Bnta1n. fhc \,,rdck rlan 
L·nl:,tp'>ed vdi~ ·1 f inland could Ill..)! l!>.:cept it 
,ts ci liilk 1n nnc fonn ,11· :m<lthcr with the 
1.1..C. The three plam tor :S,,,rdic ~ov-
1...Tnlllt'lll~1I 1.·,•.lfk'rali1,n ,.,ere J.11 depcndt'nt 
()f1 Jc,clopmcnt..; in thL' ... urn)un,lin~ .. ,·,1r!J 
Thi-. dt:pl'nd,::1(_c t,; .. '1..'iHTlc~. -..rill more 
l':dp:,hk 1r1 d lt 1 n~cr hi\lilri ... -al pcr,pet...'tivc. 
l'n,.,,.,a··, '> 1ll<lr1 ,>\er Denmark in JR64 
1111._·~1nt .1 sudden end tu S(·t111t1ill{l\ ntli, a 
tnu\·cnlL'nt r1..·_;~.irdinµ S,.:andi11a\·ia J.\ a 
:1:t1ural unit natJonally. c'ultural!y, and 
f'"l1tical/1 :md of the .sa11c.· kind and 1,ith 
tlk ,ame huur,:cois ,upp,>rter, as. f,1r in-
. r:rn,,e. the Italian undic·ation nmv~mcnt ::t 
.d)~1u1 the "an1e t1::11.:. Sc~111drnavi\n1 n.':...'eived 
i,, death hlow in I ~64 when the: united· 
k,nf',/,,m of S\\ cden-'.\orway refused lP 
._,·,nw L, l);,._·nn1Jrk·s :ts~i ... tanL:e. 
i):'rlii,, \\',,r!J War I on th,' u,hcr hand 
I 
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outside pressure gave impetus to Scancfiria-
vian unity. During the war the kings and the 
prime and foreign ministers met several 
times to consider the situation of the three 
countries. · 
With the Soviet Union ancl Germany 
weakened as a result of the war. the 
stimulus to Scandinavian cooperation - or, 
more correctly, Nordic cooperation, as 
Finland had now gained its independence -
disappeared again. During the 1920s Fin-
land was more oriented towards the Baltic 
countries than towards the Nordic region. 
The ministerial meetings were no longer as 
frequent. 
The 1930s meant again a development 
toward more intensified cooperation. After 
Hitler's Mw h11ihemah111e in I 913 Danish 
Premier Stauning sugge,ted a N,,rdic de-
fence treaty 1 n I 934 the Finnish govern-
ment of Kivim,ihi ,aid that it favoured a 
'.\iord1c 11,·utral ;1: pPI icv. The Nordic orien-
tal inn ,•:a, an attempt to avoid gc'.tli,1!'. into a 
,qucczc in 1he ,·ase of a Russian-Cicnnan 
l'i"h'lUJitt:"r. Thi.'.' Ru"-'\ian l'!l\'OY :\s~mw; had 
told the hnni,h r,crnier that the s,,,i<'l 
L :·.:,)11. if thrcatL111..:J hy Gern13ny. for -.,cc-
u:11v rca-..\)ns 1night h.ive to ,x:cupy pan~ of 
Finianl! Ev dis~n~a).!e1ncnt frnn1 (Jen~1any 
an--l Jra\\ i;1g clu~Cr~ tnward\ rne :\l,rdiL· 
u,untri.:s. F
0
inland h,,pcd to con,in,c the 
Sl)\'iet l '.ninn of the :.:cnuinl'ntss nf its 
neutraiit\ pnli.:y. -\s a :,,nscqucncc of the 
Fin11i1.i11 1 .!i..'ntation IO\\~tnb th(: ~t,rdic area. 
d(·liherdt ·., ...,t~trtt·d :th1,ut a common Fin-
msh-Swcciish d~feqcc ,,r tLc d,:1nilitari1cd 
-\Janel !..landc. in the B:,ltic. 
ment with developments in the surrounding 
world as an impelling force. There does not 
seem to be any independent impe!us inside 
the Nordic countries themselves towards 
Nordic cooperation. There was no attempt 
to intensify cooperation during the 1920s 
when the influence from the surrounding 
world was exceedingly small. If there had 
been such an independent impetus times 
should have been very favourable for such a 
force to work with no disturbing factors 
from the world around. 
Instead of intensified N,ordic cooperation 
during the 1920s there were on the contrary 
signs of inter-Nordic tensions. When the 
Swedish foreign minister Carl Hedcrstierna 
in an after-dinner speech in I 921 - possibly 
acting upon the impulse of the moment - as 
a personal opinion ,uggcstcd a Finnish-
Swedish defence union in the event of an 
unpro,uked attack frpm 'the nci~hhllur in 
the Ea.:;t'. hl' w~t:-. fnrccd to rc:-i~n on ac-
count of the -. ;,,:c-nt protests. Around I cno a 
crisis was threatening in ·nanish-Norwc>gian 
reiatinns wh,·n '.'/mway challenged Danish 
wprcn,acy o,cr Easkrn (irccnland. 
When nn the nthcr hand the cxtem;il 
prcs:-iure h;h hl'i .. ·11 ver) ,trnng, ~1ttc1nph at 
(oopcration h~l\.-L hHl~.._·11 down. That was 
thi: ca-..c \\ hL'll thL· ~ordic rL·t_1io11 Liu:d a 
,tr,,nt! J'n,,.·.ia 111 I Sh--1 and in the lcttc I 'nth 
v.hc,; th.: :-;l,r\li,.: ,:ountric..., wLrc \Unrn1:1ded 
hv (i,·rn1any prl'p.ircd for war and the USSR 
n;uch str<1nc:,·r than a Jccadc e:irlin ·1 his 
·x;.i" ~d'l() 1}1l' ... i111at11 ,n in I iJ,tlJ \\ hen thl' 
ri,·~111ti.itiun:--, fiir ,t Scmdm:1·.ian lkk1i,.:e 
11n\\1 11 bnihL· Jov.n l hL~ Cold V/ar \v;1<... 1111 
I• Tiw ~'\ordic ail'd wa~ one- uf tlw LLi" \\~ty. But dS external factors had driven the 
\,(1rdic cnuntr'.:.._·s ~,i~ethcr. '->O r..;xtL·rn;d Lti..:-
tnrs split them ag:~;n 'icid1,_·r Hi,kr nor 
'>1:tlin wanted 'snrdic Clh'J'er<1tiun. in 1937 
Staunin!! ahandnnd his ,·:irlicr , icw and 
')Jid 1h.(1 Dcrnnark was nu ll,nt,'L'I pr,~·~1are1.i 
to he a watch-de,;.: at the ,,,.Jthnn !corder of 
the ;\.'ordic cour:;nc, When the l_'SSR in 
19>9 \Ctnc,I the .-\!aiod l'L1n this was drop 
pcd. 
Ti:c p;cturc of r.h,· attcli ·pts at ;\ordic 
point\ of 1:1!cr...,cl'il(Jn 11t ... upcrpowcr m-
lcr,·sh 
\'.'hen th,·r·· have been attc1,q1ts :11 "sordic 
Uh>~h~rati():1, li1,: lon·ign pcilitical \ituatinn 
can he 1·~·:aracknzcd a-; sorncthi11g 111idway 
bct\vt·,, litc',c t\\tJ t:xtrcrncs LxH:rnal fac-
h 1f\ h~!, l' 1n1twkd :,Jordic (_·011pcration. 
Sweden-:\"~"· ay assi'itcd Dern nark 
11 ,,J,t,mh 111 tl:c l)a11i,h-l'rus,ian con!lict in 
I ~--18-1850. Prw.' ia wa, not yet the ,•rcat 
power it was tll fic 1n I 861 It ,houltJ he 
.__i;iT:L'r.i!inn i, ()nl'. nt an ur:du!atin.~ !1 1()\'l'-
' 
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underlined that Sweden-Norway did not in-
tervene on the Danish side until they had 
learned that Russia intended to' support Den-
mark diplomatically. World War I meant an 
external influence on Scandinavian coop-
eration. The position of the Nordic coun-
tries was then not as exposed as during 
World War II when the ,trategic factors 
meant a much more immediate threat to 
them. In the same way - as win he de-
monstrated below - the Marshall Plan in-
itiated an attempt at Nordic cooperation. 
The plan was not considered to imply that 
the Nordic countries took sides with any of 
the superpowers in the incipient Cold War. 
At least not if the participation in the plan 
occurred under the cloak of Nordic coop-
eration. But when, at about the same time 
or somewhat later. it was a question of 
connes;ting a Scandinavian defence union to 
Western military cooperation the external 
pressure crossed the threshold. Con-
sequently the negotiations collapsed. 
To sum up: When it has been quiet and 
peaceful in the surrounding world there has 
been no Nordic cooperation. An increased 
activity in the surrounding world which has 
tended to put the Nordic region, or part 
thereof, i\_to great power politic~ has im-
plied ince'\tives for Nordic coi>perath>n. 
When these forces have grown stronger. the 
attempt~ at cooperation have broken down. 
Ill. THE NORDIC CUSTOMS UNION 
NEGOTIATIONS, 1947-1959 
Against this background it is astonishing to 
what extent debate and re~arch in this area 
have had a purely Nordic point -of ·,depar- · 
turc. Thus the debate ahou1 the two Nordic 
post-war customs unwn projects has a 
priori had as a prerequisite the assumption 
that Nordic economic cooperation would be 
very advantageous for the Nordic countries, 
despite the fact that all trade statistics indi-
cate that the commercial interests of the 
post-war period have been in Western 
Europe, for Finland also in Eastern Europe. 
Existing research has not sufficiently dis-
cerned external and economic Jong-term 
factors when dealing with problems con-
cerning Nordic governmental cooperation. 
This conclusion is valid not least for the 
Nordic customs union negotiations of 1947-
1959. In order to demonstrate this a~d to 
demonstrate the usefulness of my apprqach, 
I will discuss these negotiations froni my 
point of departure in some depth. 
The initiative was a direct consequence of 
the Marshall Plan in the summer of 1947. 
The small Scandinavian countries needed 
American capital but wanted to remain 
neutral in the incipient struggle between 
East and West. A Scandinavian customs 
union - Finland was at the time out of the 
question due to its special relationship with 
the USSR - was considered as a means of 
such a policy. 3 A committee was estab-
lished for closer investigation. In a prelimi-
nary report in January 1950 the committee 
stated that there was no ground for an ag-
reement. 
This was only a fortnight after the US 
had explained to the three Scandinavian 
foreign ministers that a regional Nordic 
customs union would not merit the three 
countries more Marshall capital. The US 
wanted not regional but Western European 
economic cooperation. 
The governments did not bury the issue, 
however. The committee got new instruc-
tions in November 1950. The new mandate 
was restricted to a limited free trade area. In 
the spring of 1954 the committee rendered 
its final report. It came to divided conclu-
sions. The Danes and the Swedes argued 
that there was ground for a Nordic common 
mar-ket-where.rs the Norwegians -held an 
opposite viewpoint. 
Not even this report resulted in a burial of 
the issue. Instead it was raised from the 
expert level to the highest political level. A 
joint cabinet meeting instructed a new Nor-
dic Economic Cooperation Committee 
(NECC) to investigate areas where elimina-
tion of trade restrictions would imply over-
whelming advantages for all three countries. 
In 1956 Germany. France, Italy, and the 
' 1 
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Benelux countries had advanced plans fur a 
common market. Other Western European 
.rountries than the Six feared the risk of a 
trade political split in Western Europe. In 
the summer of 1956 an association of other 
countries in the form of a free trade area 
was suggested as a way of avoiding such a 
split. An investigation was also decided 
upon. 
From now on the Nordic and the Euro-
pean investigations ran parallel. In July 
1957 when the NECC issued its final report 
covering some 80 percent of inter-Nordic 
trade and a year later, when it handed over 
its supplementary report covering the rest of 
inter-Nordic trade, nothing was decided but 
to wait for the outcome of the Paris talks on 
a Western European free trade area. 
When the talks had broken down in 
November 1958 different proposals for alt-
erations to the NECC reports were consi-
dered. Simultaneouj;ly during the spring of 
I 959 the governments of the countries left 
outside the Six customs union were 
negotiating over an outer European free 
trade area. When the governments had ag-
reed on such an area - EFT A - the Nordic 
plan was rejected in July 1959. 
The importance of the surrounding world 
for the freedom of action of the Nordic 
countries has already been suggested. A 
framework for the foreign political activities 
of the countries existed, and its appearance 
varied with time. During the period studied 
here such a framework for the foreign 
policy of the No"i-dic countries was provided 
by the Cold War. The ·framework of the 
Cold War can be looked upon as an inde-
pendent variable or as an external factor 
upon which the foreign policy of the Nordic 
countries had to depend. The foreign politi-
cal factors which constitute a framework for 
the government and other agencies are here 
of the kind that they determine the de-
velopment in the Jong run. The change of 
such factors occurs slowly and the change 
hardly becomes clear over a short period. 
They could be characterized as long-term 
factors. 
' - ------- _:_. - -- ~ --
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Theoretically the foreign political options 
for alliances were manx, but in reality they 
were limited by long-term geopolitical and 
historical/political factors such as the im-
portance of the outlets of the Baltic and the 
areas north of the Arctic Circle, and the 
interests of the Western powers in Denmark 
and Norway and of the USSR in Finland in 
a conflict situation between the two blocs, 
and with Sweden in an intermediate posi-
tion. Regarding the options, the Nordic re-
gion must of course not be considered as a 
unity. These long-term factors are cen-
trifugal to Nordic cooperation. 
Other long-term factors of relevance here 
are the economic and industrial structures. 
As has been mentioned the Nordic countries 
had their economic interests primarily in 
Western Europe, Finland also in Eastern 
Europe. The Nordic area was only of sec-
ondary interest. The long-term foreign 
political factors worked centrifugally on the 
Nordic region, and so .did the long-term 
economic factors. 
Swedish industries were much more ad-
vanced than Norwegian industries. Ag-
riculture meant relatively more in Denmark 
than in the neighbouring countries. Norway, 
Finland, and Sweden were better provided 
with raw materials than Denmark. Theoreti-
cally Denmark could provide the rest of 
Norden with agricultural goods but this 
complementarity remained on paper. An 
import of Danish agricultural products 
would have politically impossible effects on 
the ~mall farmers in the other three coun-
tries. Also the social structure was a long-
term factor of relevance, as was the long-
term industrial structure. 
Barbara Haskel has made interesting 
contributions to the discussion of Nordic 
post-war governmental cooperation. She 
goes beyond earlier descriptive research in 
trying to explain what happened. 4 She does 
it in a methodoloiically interesting way 
and, more than ear her research, does she 
put the Nordic area in a European perspec-
tive. 
Although not explicitly, she uses external 
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and internal factors in her analysi_s. Her 
emphasis is, however, on th~ economic 
factors. Political factors arc hardly consi-
dered in a satisfying way. She also disre-
gards the long-term factors affecting the 
development. A more systematic use of 
these concepts would probably have brought 
about more convincing conclusions. 
Haskel regards Nordic and European 
cooperation as different options. · From 
economics she has borrowed the concept of 
opportunity costs. A Nordic customs union 
is systematically related to different Euro-
pean market solutions. It was all the time a 
matter of choosing the most advantageous 
of different alternatives by measuring the 
costs of taking one option in terms of other 
options that could have oeen followed in-
stead. The cost of choosing one specific 
option is the benefit foregone by not using 
~ another prevailing option. Haskel describes 
. the negotiations in terms of concepts from 
: bargaining theory: Denmark and Sweden 
} used an expansive strategy, 1.e. they 
thought that the joint benefit could increase 
I in a Nordic customs union, the size of the 
whole pie could be increased; whereas 
Norway fq_llowed a distributive strategy~ 
i.e. it reg~ it to be a matter ot settling 
the shares oflhe different players, the divi-
sion of a more or less constant pie_ 
The difference in strategies resulted in 
antagonism during the negotiations between 
Denmark and Sweden on the one side and 
Norway on the other. The knot was hard to 
untie as the limited inter-Nordic trade made 
the incentives small for fundamental 
changes in the domestic economic policies 
\ of the, countries. The comparative1y...small 
gains at stake did not invite any more far-
reaching concessions. 5 
Haskel concludes that while non-
economic considerations did not preclude, 
the Nordic market, neither did they enhanc-t! 
its value. The economic prerequisites 
existed but they were not sufficient. There 
was a lack of incentives from oth~r political 
areas to supply the needed lubricant or. with 
her own words, grease for an agreement. 6 
Haskel' s method results in an emphasis 
on the economic factors. The political fac-
tors, which accordin_g to her were missing, 
but necessary to bring about a Nordic cus-
toms union, are not analysed in depth. lli. 
Haskel builds her analysis on intervi ws 
with some 25 central decision-makers in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. For 
rest, the source material is mostly printed 
reports of the governmental committees and 
journal and newspaper articles. Of the vol-
uminous unpublished archive material that 
remains from the negotiations she has only 
had access to about five memoranda and 
notes m the Norwegian Foreign Depart-
ment. She touches only marginally on the 
role of Finland. Nor has she used any Fin-
nish sources. 
Haskel's study is methodologically in-
teresting. This is true not least in her use of 
the concepts of po! itical and economic fac-
tors_ But she does not discuss the difference 
and the limits between these factors. To 
Haskel the political factors become simply 
residual factors which she seizes upon when 
the economic factors appear to be insuffi-
cient to explain what happened. 
Whereas the economic factors are easy to 
explore, the political considerations behind 
the decisions are not as easily distinguisha-
ble in the public and printed material. The 
question is whether Haskel's source mat-
erial leads her to disregard the political 
factors. 
The state secrecy laws make it difficult or 
impossible to get hold of the unprinted mi-
nutes, drafts, and memoranda from the 
negotiations in the governmental archives. 
There is however a by-pass. The industrial 
federations played a very active role i.n the 
negotiations. The governments had a great 
need for the technical knowledge of the 
federations during the very dynamic de-
velopment of the market questions. There 
were frequent and mutual briefings. In the 
archives of the federations is left a great 
deal of the same material which is still kept 
secret in government archives. And as. non-
public organizations, the federations are not 
IU 
.. 
. ' 
The 1//usory Nordic Alternative to Europe . 109. 
,. 
subject to the state secrecy laws. Through 
access to the archives of the federations it 
has been possible to follow the negotiations 
in detail. . The unprinted material there 
makes it possible to analyse the political 
and economic factors in the Nordic customs 
union negotiations. However, the pre-
requisite for such an undertaking is that 
some clarification of concepts is made. One 
has to distinguish between economic and 
political factors. 
In this study economic factors are defined 
as referring to comparative advantages, pos-
sibilities of large scale production, speciali-
zation, and increased productivity, im-
provements· of balances of payments, and 
economic growth. The politicaL factors on 
the other hand are, among others, security 
politics and ideological considerations. 
Furthermore, if a group of countries tries to 
agree on economic cooperation in order to 
get a better position and strength in trade 
negotiations with other countries, the coop-
eration is looked upon as primarily decided 
by a political factor. 7 
One also has to distinguish between 
means and ends when regarding economic 
and political factors. Of course economic 
and political factors do interfere, mingled 
with each other and as means and ends, in a 
complicated manner. 
Theoretically one could as tools of 
analysis consider the following alternatives: 
I. The projected Nordic customs union 
was an economic or a political end in itself. 
2. The projected Nordic customs union 
was an economic or a political means to an 
economic or a political end. 
To make things even more complicated 
one has to take into account the fact that, 
for example, political means to achieve 
economic ends could appear disguised as 
economic ends in their own right. In such a 
case the means has to be regarded as politi-
cal and the end as economic. 
My hypothesis is that the Nordic customs 
union negotiations were a means to achieve 
a better position in the European trade 
negotiations during the 1950s and that they .. 
• 
were primarily politically. motivated, not 
economically. 
As has been stressed, the .political and 
economic factors are as a rule. not quite pure 
but intermixed in any debate on economic 
cooperation. It has also been underlined that 
an essential undertaking is to distinguish 
them from each other by analysing the de- . 
bate and the negotiations. But a prerequisite 
for such an undertaking is that the concepts . 
are used as a point of departure. This ap-
proach is different from concentrating on 
one of them and degradi.ijg the other to a 
residual factor at the end. 
The best possibility to test whether Nor-
dic cooperation was economically motivated · 
must be to investigate how those organiza-
tions reacted whose whole existence is jus-
tified by taking economic - long-term as 
well as short-term - factors into considera-
tion. The attitudes of the industrial federa-
tions to a Nordic customs union are a tool in 
order to consider if su,;h a customs union at 
all or to some extent could be a long-term 
economic goal in itself. The attitudes are 
then related to the long-term and short-term 
factors, and to external and internal factors. 
If the industrial federations- with regard 
to both their long- and short-term interests 
- were negative or little interested in a 
Nordic customs union, it is probable, con-
sidering their representativity of industry in 
the Nordic countries, that a Nordic customs 
union was not economically motivated. 
The federations were initially very hesit-
ant about the Nordic customs union project. 
In 1949 the Federation of Norwegian In-
dustries (NI) expressed a negative view-
point. It continued to hold this view aH the 
time up to 1959. The NI regarded the whole 
existence of Norwegian industry to be 
threatened Sy, above all, Swedish industry. 
The large export enterprises which had less 
to fear had not much to gain in a Nordic 
market. 
The Federation of Swedish Industries (SI) 
was sceptical. but not so much on account 
of the economic consequences. Instead it 
feared a development toward a planned ·. 
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economy led and inspired by Social ,Demo-
cratic governments in all the Sfandinavian 
countries. In purely economic terms the 
trade associations of the SI had little objec-
tion. This made the criticism of the SI 
somewhat hollow. The head organization 
began in the early I 950s to speak about the 
Nordic project in more po,itive terms. The 
SI said that economically Sweden had no-
thing to lose. Hut a Nordic market would be 
too small for garn, of any importance. For 
such gains bmipcan wopcrat1on was dc-
mand(•.<l. 
The h:dcrat1on of Danish lndu,trics (DI) 
w;,s more pt,,1t1vc, Repeatedly it cxprc,,cd 
a positl'c viewpoint, At the beginning of 
1956 this att1tudl' wa, ,uddcnly hrokcn, 
however, ;ifter a rcpnn h:, the ,!overnmcntal 
u>rm11illcc \b,s,VL' prntc,t, against the re-
port frnrn the paper ;ind metal mdw,tries 
· n1;11k the l>I ,h,11,!!,, ,rs , ,r1111"" hnrn then 
,.,,,~ "n the Ill held a hcsit;,n, VIL'" ,,r, the :-,.;ordic 
~-! 
; plan l 'I he three kdcr;1t1nn..., v. antcd a lan..:'lT 
i 1:urllpt.'an n1;1rkl't. 111'. \ ~rµucd inkn...,c!~, il1 
i \11pport ,I! ;1 l·_tlf1)p·',1;, trl·..: tr:td\..· arl.'a \\hen 
... 
~1 
~· 
llt .. ·~•1}!Jalllll!~ 11:1 \lll II dil ;__tfl'cl •,t;H1l'd in 
IIJ)h_ 'IL1 dd:H.t,lti~:" f(ir thL ln11ilt: 1narJ...1..:t 
111du,trit.:, ~1111d 1..lTL11ni\ he Ja1_.21..·r rh:11i ill 
~· 'iHdlt.. 111.irkL·l, hut ;/),.· '.'.ain, tif lih.:: LXp 
1ndu'.l11c, v.Puld hi: p1ud1 L1q:Lr. 
I he l·nlc1.,1,,.,, ,,1 I llllll'h l:,,!u,trin 1H1 
L,i11;c In lhc ,;1r1H' L,inrl:i'1H:ll I 1nl~nh1 did 
nuf t'!l!t"! Ilic "\ur,!h i1•_'l.'1 1r1:11in11· until ]1Vi(, 
,..,.hr11 1h rl'l 1lH 1lh 1·. :!Ii :th· l 'SSR d1.111.Pcd 
.1· .. 1 1.1111,t 1pw111·,· ol 1i1( fll'\\ R111.,,1.m p,,Ll·_. 
ul ;, .• ,h':_·!ul ... t1i.'\J\kl1, i..' .-\1 thi..' hCflllfllTlf-. 
the t i \a.,1, \!.'f\ liL·,.11:rn1 .1, rq..':111..h 1hc \';:luc 
, 111 .1 ,'\,nrdh , [1-..1,Hli', un111n. ht11 \·dl\.'11 the 
! iil/11\h ~l/\ L'! :111),.'fll ,ll ,J lliLl'illl,I.! \\ 1111 tl.,· l I 
111 ! !l:U.H\ 111"1 / c\pl,!lnl·i..1 th;it thi..· '.\u:·dii.. 
:.ill,.,, ,lhltdd bt· rq.',t!"Licd ~1:,.. .1 ~a:t.'\\ ,ty 11, 
\\.'t·,li.·n1 l.u,,,1,t· thL· i I r.1p11..lly l~lnk :1 ptl'-1 
:1v1..· ·.:~·\\.,., 
\\hen. ;1t1cr i'l:\h. kdcrat1011, .i:,J t'''' 
;_·rnn1cnt, tud [hl' -...1mt: t:-~ll!t: pPl1Ly _L'l',ll'-. 
!hl..' L"\H~L1L'~, hct\\l'Cn th:..'lll ht'L'Jfllt: \Cf\ in-
lCJl\L' \\. lu.·n !lit· ;.:~ul" h.id he~n Jiffcrent 
thL' 1.·t.)!l!al·:" ''"(.·re nt a illllil..' lt.•nn.d 1..h:tr.11.:-
ter. After 1956 all four governments began 
to give priority to increased European 
economic cooperation, Finland however 
only indirectly via Nordic cooperation. 
They began to stress the same economic 
factors as the federations, which long since 
had argued that their main interest was in a 
European market. The antagonism towards 
a Nordic customs union was put aside. Nor-
dic cooperation became a matter of making 
participation in European cooperation 
easier. Nordic cooperation became a matter 
of tactics. It could at the utmost be an 
instrument to achieve membership in Euro-
rcan cooperation, nothing more. 
The attitudes of the industrial federations 
indicate that a .\'orclic customs union ivas 
1101 c1w:omicallr 11u,1irn1ed. \Vas it then 
politically motivated'' And what then was 
the political aim.' 
The ,cry <'fib in ,,f the :-,.;ordic prnject \\as 
a, ha, hccn poinkd out - the ;\Jarshdll 
Pian, The Ln!tcd States demanded 
L'L'rJ1h1mi,: conpcL1tllHl hctwl..'cn the Euro-
;ic.rn u1u11c:·1l'." Ill rt·turn fnr \1arslull 
llhlilC)'. The .'\,,i"i.:ic l'USl0/1)~ union r•Lm was 
rnll':idcd \() di.::1~1un.-.tr...:tc the intcrL'\l df tt1c 
'.\urJi1..· L'()LJ.Jltncs in such l·oupl-ratillll. ,\t the 
-.,;rnii..: :1rnc tht: plan was a mean-., uf aYoiding 
t,Hl l"]{l\C an a\:-.Pciation \\Jih the ~· .... ·-.,::rn 
p(J ,, ~·1.., in the ; li.:iplL'rll ,tru!_.:~k oi the (_ \ll,J 
War, lhc 1hrc, g<J\LT1m1e111, wanted 1,, re-
llldin uuhidc the blil1.. -hui!dm~. i'lii ... pP!i,:~ 
wa" L''-f)LL·ially :··hkrcd in L.1h\lur--~-.1\i..:r11cJ 
~{ll"\\.1_\ and \,;,cdc11. l)t.·nrnarl,_ tud .il the 
(il,11..' ;1 11011-\ULl,iJI\( !,.:0\<...Tf~J1iL'llt. 
AlLT l<i>h the ,\orJ,L· plan'-''" rcga,,k-d 
i' ~t 111c:in, or :is an irhlrumcnt which c-.1ulJ 
'...:!\·L. !ht· :-.;urd1c L·,)u11tri1..·, a hetter pth,:i,1fl 
:n thL_' Luropl'..tll 111:irli..:t ill'~ot1:1tions. The 
\1illi1<...· ncgotiatio11" \\Crc L'll!llpktely lk-
f)l'Ih_k11f uJJ !hi...' Pari~ ialks .. .....;{,1~!i...._ ..._.l,tllh.'.fa-
''"n \\,!\ ,n,trurnental l><\\,1rJs a l:uropean 
,llll 1 \'( ,rdu · cDO/h'l"Ul ii 11! h·li.\ JJuiili( ·tdly 
nm.li!i,n:,,d in i'hc \ct1.\e ilwt it 11.',:c11dci to 
.t(:4 ·ilLd!c /hlf"!U i/'d.'i( ,n in Lurupcun c:l(>p-
t l"i,''1011. ~l)fdic L"t i11p('ral11 •n \\:a" d 111:...·::1h <if 
ct,.:h1l'\ int1 J'.1\JJ-\'t,rdic gC1,ils. 
l;itu th" pc1t1crn ahu i'1h ,he 111ud, puhli-
IU 
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·-cized close cooperation between the'"Nordic 
countries during the GA TI round in 1964. 
This cooperation was in the contemporary 
political debate frequently interpreted as a 
new step towards Nordic cooperation but 
was hardly anything mm c than a tactical 
cooperation in order to achieve non-Nordic 
goals. The same is valid also for the Nordek 
Plan. Denmark did not conceal that the plan 
was intended as a bridge to the Common . 
Market. When Finland - on account of its 
special relationship with the Soviet Union, 
i.e. an external factor - could not accept 
this. the negotiations broke down. 
But what about the new tum in the Nor-
dic customs union negotiations in 1954? 
After the experts had disagreed over the 
pmsihilities for a Nordic customs union the 
issue was simply raised to the highest 
. politicai lewl. This was two years after 
\ larshall aid had ceased and one or two 
y,·.,rs before ;h.: dcvelopn11:nt uf the l'uro-
1w.m market plans. There was a ''"" nw, ing 
in European econ~H111c coop~ration. 
1.ihcr.dintion ol trade within the framework 
,,r the OELC ,rnd the GATT hJd )!Ot stu,·k. 
The ,tdrl ut ,he new inquiry in 19:i-+ docs 
nut seem to tit v,-ry well into the pattern 
a hove. The '-iorwegian L1hour government 
initiated the ne'.v ;n\l'\tigatit,n. /\u .. -ording 
t,, the \'.rnwcgi~in ~lh··~;·:rn1c1H :\uiJic \.:oop-
eralllm should he a counter,, eight 1<, the 
alliance with the ,·ountri,-s Pll the continent. 
The I ahour ;!overnn"·nt h.tcl rc.,,>1,s for its 
;ndt .. ~llVL' .. \ ;1Pt unimpnrunt L.:i"t-win.~. fai.:-
til~ll l.)f th~ ~\)\L'rn1ne11t pan~ {1hjcctcd to 
\:()f\\'cgian p~.rticqutilin in \\'..:~tt:n1 n1ilitary 
c~1t1pcr;itidn arid h~lJ t(1 he p,Lificd. The fact 
i'.1:il thl'. Ltct1,1n ::;ainl'.d influence at ahout 
this ti:nc .sh<>'.:i,J he cPnsidcred against the 
h;ick2rnt,nd ;if ~ hur~c,,:iing ckvciqpmcnt 
l\,\,;i;ds peaceful ~oc;istencc alter Stalin's 
dca,h in I l/53. In or,kr to p:ic1ly the Left--
\i. in~ tad1,1n :\!ordic C1iupi.:rJtiPn was to th~ 
purpose.'' 
\\ hv 1lJc:, d:d Dcn;11c.rk and Sweden ac-
c,·pt ,;1ch a 'Jore.lie p!:,n .' Or di,i they really 
acn,pt it' lt mu,t he stressed that J\:ordic 
e<>C1p~n•1on h :, concept lull of ,ip11licancc 
The l/lusory Nordic Alternative to Europe 11 I 
in the Nordic region. This makes it a politi-
cally interesting idea, which must be treated 
with some care. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the failures of the large· post-war 
schemes for Nordic cooperation have been 
covered by new initiatives for cooperation, 
which however have been much less far-
reaching than the intended unsuccessful 
plans. The failure of the Scandinavian de-
fence union talks in 1948--49 was followed 
by a decision on a common passport area, 
the projected Nordic customs union by the 
Helsinki treaty in 1962 on intensified coop-
eration in different areas, and the Nordek 
Plan by the establishment of a Nordic 
Ministerial Council. These agreements have 
meant nothing but the development of a 
pragmatic cooperation. For politicians who 
have failed to agree on Nordic cooperation 
in more spectacular fom1s, such pragmatic 
cooperation has had the merit of appealing 
to puhlic opinion. No1J1sm -- defined as the 
idea of hringing the. Nordic countries to-
gether as much as possible - is mostly 
prevalent among intellectuals. But it is 
widespread enough to he a political factor 
of some importance. 10 
Against this background it is undcr-
standahlc that lJcntnark and Sweden found 
it h:ud to openly n.:_1c,ct the Norwegian in-
ni.,tive 111 J c;·,4 alter the failure of the expert 
cornmltk(.:. Hut it v~:ry soon hccamc ohvi-
"us that I kiilllark and Sweden had no in-
tention of) icldlng to the, Norw,·gian ideas. 
The \C11wq.:1an plan v.:i, ah,,rtive. The 
\on.lie negotiations had aln:ady rot stuck 
when dcvelop,nenls on the continent 1nadc 
it pos,1hk Jo ;idapt the \ordic plan to the 
lll:irket T1l:_:;otiatiur1\ then:. 
In a way the loicign political ,ituat1on 
around : 9,4 wa, rc111in1sccnl of that of the 
I 'J20s Acuvitv in the outside world was 
low \ de-escalation of the Cc,Id War had 
slu· ... , het_:un after Stalin's death. Wntcm 
Luwpca11 ~conomic cooperation umkr Mar-
shall aid had become ,tuck, as ha, hccn 
mentiom:d. ThLO san,c nn he s;iiJ about 
Western Lu rope an politicil cooperation. In 
1954 th..: pr111cctc,l 1.uropcan !Jcfcncc 
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Community was discarded. If there had 
· been an independent impetus ;or Nordic 
cooperation inside the Nordic countries 
themselves the time should have been 
favourable around 1954. But as during the 
192<h there was no such cooperation. The 
Norwegian swallow did not make a sum-
mer. 
If the governments treated the Nordic 
customs union mainly as a political means, 
the industrial federations - on account of 
the very nature of their function as interest 
group, - wanted to consider it as a matter of 
economic advantage or disadvantage. Re-
garding the customs union from this view-
point, the federations came to other conclu-
sions than did the governments taking other 
factors into cons1dcrat1on .· Aftt:r 1956 the 
divcrgencies concerning the Nordic customs 
un10n receded into the hackground. The 
mam task was now Europe. This was in line 
with the 1ntercsts of the industrial federa-
tions. 
1:Jarhara Haskel concludes that the 
e,:onomic prerequisites for 1'ordic economic 
n>opcration existed hut that the cooperation 
failed hcc·au,c there wa, no political Juhric-
ant. 
My conc~sion is the opposite. The 
political prnequisitcs existed, such ,,,. 
.1111011),! oihl·rs. the Nordic plan as an in,tru-
rnn,t towanh thl, real !-'."al. par1icipat1011 in 
l.uropcan cooperation. There '>' a, economic 
luhn,·ant to "llllC extent. hut far frorn 
cnnu,,h to make lhc ,ord1c cu~tOlll\ union 
.m 111,kpcndcnt )!oal. 
,\ po111( of dcp,HllHC fill lla,kl'i is It> 
it·~;ud !\JprJ1L· and I u1opc:m .._·onpcr..ition a~ 
~ ,1,tkrcnt op11011' \Iv lhc·,,, "that thnc did 
not l"\tst .111_, :'lion!,,· ,iltcrnativc to Luropean 
,·,·,11H11111, ,ot>peration At 1nt>sl. it could he 
au L'i,·mL"nl of ii. 
I\" ( '()'.\/Cl l lSIONS 
t 't><•rcr.111,,n f1L"IWL"en the '.'.'ordic cuu111ncs 
ha, hL"l"ll an ,,hJC,! ,,f peat 1111crc'1 in the 
pol1th . ..ii d~hatt'. NlllJi, . .- ..:\1pp~.:r.iti,.in h:.t:'1 iJ()t 
. ,t·!dt,111 h~cn dl.'~~·nhcd a ... -..nmt:thing un-
ique. It has often been contrasted with, for 
instance, European cooperation. My case 
study of the projected Nordic customs union 
during the 1950s reveals that Nordic coop-
eration was not an alternative to European 
cooperation but at most an element of it. 
The conclusion is based on a long histori~al 
perspective. The concepts of long-/short-_ 
term, external/internal, and economic/ 
political factors are used to discern 
explicitly the premises for Nordic coopera-
tion. The attitudes of the Nordic industrial 
federations - motivating their whole exis-
tence by taking economic long- and short-
term factors into consideration - have been 
the tools for deciding if a Nordic customs 
union could be an independent economic 
goal. 
In my study it has been difficult to trace 
an independent and inherent will to achieve 
Nordic economic cooperation except on the 
level of individuals. There the influence of 
Nordism as an active force is manifest. But 
it has hardly been the stimulus of the gov-
ernments. It has only contributed to keeping 
the idea of Jl,;ordic cooperation alive among 
politicians. The incitements have heen im-
pulses from the outside world, incitements 
in the form of threats or possihilities. When 
the external forces have grown t(,o strong 
they have, ho'>'cver. not hrought ahout an 
illlpubc in a unifying direction. The Nordic 
countries realized the impetus for Nordic 
rnuperation in 1947 hut the realization was 
as ever - dependent on devclupments 
outside :\'orden. 
A sy,tcmatic use of the concepts of cx-
tcrnal1 intnnal, lung-/,hort-terrn, and 
ee<l!H11111c,puli1ical factors leads to the con-
ciu,ion that external political _and 
c,.>nn11J1c Jong-term factor, operate ccn-
lrifu!!ally ,111 Nordic cooperation. Only 
during solllc ,hort periods of time when the 
ntcrnal force, have neither hcen too ,mall 
nur too strnn!l docs there seem to ha, e hecn 
a stimulus frnm the out,ide 11 "rid toward, 
N1irdic Cllllperation. For the rest thne Lc-
1,,rs h.1, e w orkcd against such coop~r.;tinn . 
Th~ L'1..u1101nil'. facturs have meant a ma 1c,r 
IU 
> 
The 1//usorv Nordic Alternative /1) Europe I I~ 
economic and commercial interest 'for the 
Nordic c·ountries in Western Europe, for 
Finland also in Eastern Europe, not in the 
Nordic region. Long-term political factors 
of external provenance such as the Swedish 
neutrality policy, the Dani~h and Norwegian 
post-war Western alignment, and the Fin-
nish special relationship with the Soviet 
Union, have also worked in a centrifugal 
direction. These basic conditions have , 
meant a long-term trend contrary to Nordic 
governmental cooperation. 
Political short-term factors have on occa-
sion worked for an intensified attempt at 
Nordic cooperation. Here the treatment of 
different cooperation projects as a political 
tool in a European context has been pointed 
out. The same is valid for the increased 
stress on Nordic cooperation in Norway in 
1954 for domestic political reasons. Within 
the category of internal political factors 
could also he 111entioned the role of Nor-
dism. These political and internal factors. as 
a rule of a short-tern1 kind, have, however, 
hecn exceeded hy the stronger external and 
economic long-term factors. The external 
international factors have played a 
dominating role in Nordic attempts al gov-
ernmental cooperation. 
They have all the time decided the rnom 
for manoeuvrability of the Nordic countries. 
Internal factors have heen of quite a subor-
dinate impor1ance. There have certainly 
hern weak impelling fon:es for Nordic gov-
ernmental cooperation of a nwrc spectacular 
kind msidc the Nordic countries themselves. 
but they have been outweighed hy n,n-
trifu~al forces from the ,urrounding world 
C C 
working in a disintegrating direction, as the 
use of the concepts long- and short-term 
factors in a long historical perspective indi-
cates. 
NOTES 
1 Bernt Schiller has developed the concepts of 
long- and short-term factors in a study of re-
search problems in contemporary history. He 
regards the long-term factors as primary in rela-
tion to the short-term ones. The long-term or 
primary factors are, and this is a vital point in his 
argument, not anything that can be taken for 
granted. They are dependent on the point of 
departure for each study, or in Schiller's own 
words, 'determined by the hypothesis formu-
lated'. Bernt Schiller, 'Shortage and Plenty. 
Long- and Short-term Factors and Research 
Problems in Contemporary History', Scandina-
via,1 Journal of His1on·, Vol. I, No. I (1976), 
pp. 164-168. . • 
2 Bo Strath, Nordic Industry and Nordic 
Economic Cooperation, Almqvist & Wik sell In-
ternational, Stockholm 1978. This is report No. 
! from the research project Interest Organiza-
tions and Internationalism, University of 
Gothenburg. The project was established in 
1970. From the very start it has heen headed hy 
Profcs,or Bernt Schiller and has been funded 
mainly hy the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary 
hiundation. The ~encral aim of the project has 
hccn to study conditions intlucnl'ing the interna-
tional relation-; of intcrc•a organizations of ag-
riculture. industry. and lahour. To achieve this a 
long hi-.tori(al per<..;pcctivc and a comparative 
analy\i, involving ntttional, rcp:ional. and glohal 
lcvcb have frl'ljlh.'.ntly heen u..,cJ. For an outline 
of the pn>JCCt. aho includinµ the inh:rprctation ot 
the hi...,h)ry of '.\urdic cnop.:rat1on a.., ...,kctchcd 
ahovc, "l'L Bernt Schiller, lnlL'fL''>l Or~arn1.at1011'> 
and Intcrn~11ion;1Ji,111 a Rc\l':1rL·h Project on 
l\1ntc111p1irar~ Hi..,tory <forthco1111n!-!), 
1 
~tr:ith. up. CJl , pp. li'.i XI. 
4 Hd1har:.1 l-Lt..,kd, The S1·(111ri11111111111 <)Jllio,;, 
l~nivcr:-.JtL·hforbµct. (hlo 197h. ,\n1on;' olher 
anJ c:irlicr ,tud1c, on ~ordic cooperation v,h,d1 
are of rcll'\ -111cc hnc coulJ hl'. mcritionl'd Stanley 
r\11tkhcn. Ilic .\'01dic ('orwcil. A Stu,h 11; \"11111 
clinm'lun Hct;ir1nu/1,111 ( ,t111don I 'Jf)7: Nil\ /\n-
dn.:·11. ·~onJi..,k lrllL~rati«Hl SynpunktL·f uch 
Prohkn:,'.,1! 1n111µar', /11ton11\jrmul l,ol,tikJ .. 
J4tJ(): Pn-<)hif Jor1'-.\0T1, The l'rt>Jt'1 f('(I \'<w1-
,iini1i1r111 (·11\!0!ll\ lJ11in11 1947- /<J5r), unpuh-
li\tL· l Ph I) di'>·,crtat11ir1, J"lnnd;1 State l)nivn-
,il) l\J64: _\rthur \1011t\..!1)1!lcr\·, ·h«)ll\ a :'Jorth-
ern Cu .... t•.1!11" l 'nirn1 10 LrT:\., \('wir/inm·ia11 
l-.co11u1111c /11\t11n /(('l/('11 Vol. l, J(Hit/', h:11111, 
\\'cndt. I he .Vo1i/1r· ( uu111 ii and ( ·uofU'UHion 111 
\11111d1mH"1a. ('t•\H"l1h:q1en J()~'J 
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'Haskel, op. cit., p 98. 
• )hid .. pp. 129-130. 
7 Str~th, op. cit., pp. 60--61. The distinction 
between economic and political factors i, used in 
earlier research on Scandinavian coopnation al-
thoul!h the concept, have not heen more closely 
defined. Cl. Ake Holmherg. 'Svcrige och den 
ekonom1ska skandinavismcn vid 1860-talet, 
borJan', in Stud,rr tilliJvwde Curt Weihu/1, 
Goihcnburg 1946, p. 224; and Mont!!omery, op. 
cit. 
\ 
• It was the Minister of Trade Aare Simonen 
who explained how the Nordic negotiations 
should he interpreted. Simonen was the leader of 
a Social Democratic minor breakaway faction 
which, as distinguished from the major factipn, 
had the Kremli~'s confidence. Whether Siqio-
ncn's green light to Western Europe via Nortlic 
cooperation had been reinsured in the USSR has 
not heen possible to determine. · 
9 Smith, op. cit., pp. 105-109. 
'" ]hid., pp. 43-47. 
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